Five paths forward, and why most lead deeper into escalation.

BY SIMON PEARCE FOR LIMINAL LENS / READ AND SUBSCRIBE TO LIMINAL LENS

In my last update, I estimated the probability of further escalation of this war at 80%, without providing a timeline. Since then, it appears that some Gulf States have made a concerted effort to reopen the Strait of Hormuz by attempting to reach an agreement with Iran.

Iran and Oman are actively working on such a deal, but it won’t take effect while combat is ongoing. Iran has stated this quite plainly.

This makes sense for Iran. After all, its cargo ships are still passing through the strait without issue—for now—and if it were to allow other ships to do the same while it is still being bombed by the US and Israel, it would be surrendering the only real leverage it currently has.

For practical purposes, the system currently behaves like this:

• Ongoing hostilities → Strait remains closed to most shipping
• Ceasefire → Strait can reopen through negotiation (though not necessarily resolve the broader conflict)

Having established that the strategic center of gravity of the entire conflict is the Strait of Hormuz, we see that there are only four scenarios for reopening the Strait: two escalatory and two de-escalatory. In a fifth scenario, the Strait remains closed, at least until stalemate gives way to one of the other four. These scenarios are simplified expressions of a more complex model of how the system can evolve over time. The key tables behind that model are included at the end of this post.

The scenarios include:

1. A cease-fire (either unilateral by the US or negotiated) that enables the GCC and/or others to reach a deal with Iran to reopen the Strait.
2. The Iranian regime introduces new leaders or negotiators, altering the strategic calculus for both sides and guiding toward a negotiated resolution to the war.
3. The collapse of the Iranian regime, effectively ending its ability to close the Strait.
4. The Strait is reopened by force.
5. The Strait remains closed to most shipping for months or longer.

Let’s examine each scenario one by one.

Scenario 1: A cease-fire that enables the GCC and/or other major Gulf oil consumers to negotiate directly with Iran.

This is the only immediately de-escalatory option.

For most of the world, this is probably the best and most rational option, but for the Trump administration and for the US Navy, this outcome could be problematic.

For the Navy, allowing this outcome would contradict 85 years of naval doctrine. The US has a blue-water navy primarily to keep the world’s sea lanes open for trade, free of tolls and piracy. If it cannot achieve this in Hormuz, Navy leaders might decide that US credibility as the enforcer of global freedom of navigation is severely damaged. This is a significant concern for Navy planners and admirals.

For the Trump administration, the main focus is on maintaining its own power, which depends heavily on political optics.

However, a cease-fire that would transfer control of the strait to Iran, or at least allow Tehran to collect tolls for passage (which amounts to the same thing), would be potentially humiliating for the Trump administration.

This is a critical point: while it would be in the best short-term interest of most of the global population for a cease-fire to take effect today and for Hormuz to reopen immediately, the Trump administration might see this as a hit to its status and credibility.

Of course, if I’m wrong about the internal calculations within the Trump administration, then there’s a much higher chance they will just walk away (a brief embarrassment, soon forgotten domestically once gasoline prices normalize again). We should remember that it was not the act of leaving Kabul that was political poison for Biden, but the way in which it was done. Trump will no doubt be acutely aware of this. Then again, even if the US walks away, the Israelis might not: they are far more committed to a decisive defeat of their longtime foe.

Knowing this, the Iranians have an incentive to continue escalating with ongoing missile and drone attacks on the GCC countries, along with persistent statements that Hormuz remains closed to all but their own shipping. The more economic pressure they can exert on the US administration, the more they hope to make it too costly for the US to continue the war. It’s worth noting that this was exactly how the US lost the war in Vietnam. The US could no longer afford the political costs of fighting the war. The Vietnamese strategy was, in large part, to “hang on for victory” while enduring years of being pummeled by superior US weapons.

For this reason, a ceasefire followed by a deal does not currently seem likely. It’s the most rational short-term course of action, but that alone does not mean that it will be chosen. This, of course, is the essence of an escalation trap as Prof Robert Pape has previously noted.

What might make this outcome more viable?

Clearly, direct talks between the US and Iran would be beneficial, but they seem unlikely right now. Other interested parties (many of them), who want to see the Strait reopened, will only see their own negotiations with Iran succeed if they can first get the US to cease firing.

So it comes down to this: will the Emiratis, Kuwaitis, Saudis, Qataris, and others be able to persuade the Trump administration to “declare victory and stop shooting”?

If they can, we might be shocked by how quickly a deal to reopen the Strait gets done.

So what might it take for the GCC states or their customers to convince the US to end its campaign?

This is the great unknown right now.

One thing that the US administration is likely to insist on is that the Iranians give up their enriched uranium.

The current Iranian leadership seems unlikely to take such action after the events of the past month. They don’t believe that the US and Israel will simply leave them alone if they surrender the uranium. In fact, it might have the opposite effect of reducing restraint in the future.

Meanwhile, every day the Strait remains closed weakens the US economically and Trump politically. They have every incentive to “hang on for victory” as the North Vietnamese did.

Verdict

The reason the probability is as high as 10% is that Trump may realize he’s falling into a trap and could simply decide to call the whole thing off. Ironically, the chance that Trump might just “pack up and go home” also encourages Iran to escalate further, in an attempt to force Trump to do exactly that by increasing the economic pressure on him and his allies.

Scenario 2: The Iranian regime introduces new leaders or negotiators, altering the strategic calculations for both sides and pushing toward a negotiated resolution to the war.

The US and Israel carefully avoided killing the IRGC’s more pragmatic operational staff—the individuals who manage the IRGC’s businesses and infrastructure. One of these insiders could potentially step forward to negotiate a deal with the US to end the conflict. Such a move would be viewed favorably by the US, giving Washington a face-saving way to claim victory and withdraw. This scenario is especially likely if the new leaders include the enriched uranium in their negotiations.

However, the core issue lies within the Iranian leadership itself. After the US actions over the past month, any leader proposing a compromise with the US and Israel risks being accused of treason. It is highly dangerous—politically and physically—for well-connected insiders to suggest this at present.

To do this safely, a large group of leaders would need to stage an internal “palace coup,” but even then, it might quickly lead to civil war within Iran. Any attempt to replace the mullahs as the ruling authority would likely cause internal violence unless it had widespread support among the IRGC ranks.

Verdict

Scenario 3: The Iranian regime collapses, ending its ability to close the Strait effectively.

This outcome sits at the far end of the escalation path, not at the beginning.

Regime change initially appeared appealing to the US and Israel at the beginning of this war because it offered a quick solution to the entire “Iran problem.” Removing the regime that seeks nuclear weapons and replacing it with a friendly (or at least manageable) one could reshape the Gulf region efficiently and at a relatively low cost.

That’s probably why the war began with a decapitation strike on Ayatollah Khamenei and his top leadership team.

The idea that the regime would fall or be overthrown after a decapitation strike now seems disconnected from reality. The Trump administration clearly expected a quick victory within a few weeks. How do we know this? Because no serious plan was ever implemented to keep the Strait of Hormuz open if escalation occurred.

In other words, they didn’t expect escalation in Hormuz because they believed the entire situation would be resolved quickly.

Why overlook something as obvious as a blockade of Hormuz? The answer is actually quite simple: actively preparing to counter the closure of Hormuz would have meant acknowledging that the “quick and easy” narrative might not be true. Consequently, plans developed over three generations of Pentagon officers were (it seems, reports are vague) sidelined by the political leadership to maintain group cohesion and “alignment with the boss.”

There is a long history of this type of error; as I mentioned in an essay a few months back, it almost always occurs at the intersection of civilian authorities and their military/intelligence advisors.

CIA director Richard Helms failed to warn Lyndon Johnson that the war in Vietnam was going badly; he also quashed a CIA report warning against the 1971 invasion of Cambodia. He did so not because the CIA lacked relevant data and insight, but because Nixon had already decided to invade. The CIA did its job. It gathered and interpreted information. But by making it clear that this information would be unwelcome, the leadership failed.

Verdict

The likelihood of a complete regime collapse is currently below 1% because the regime has numerous enforcers—perhaps over a million—spread throughout the country. In principle, an air assault on Tehran to establish an air bridge and bring in several US Army divisions could dismantle the leadership. That would be a bold and risky move. Not impossible, but extremely dangerous, and I’m unsure if you’d be able to take control of the entire country even if you succeeded.

Worst of all: once you’re there, how do you ever get out?

Scenario 4: The Strait is forcibly reopened.

This is the default path—not because it is attractive, but because the alternatives are structurally blocked.

This could involve a series of direct raids, assaults, and similar operations on key islands in the Strait, as well as on the Iranian coastline adjacent to it, along with a continuous hunt for missile and drone storage and launch sites in a broad area of Iran. It might also include other infrastructure-related actions, such as a move to seize Kharg Island.

If the US succeeds in blocking the strategic islands and littoral areas as bases of operation, the Iranians, feeling they are losing leverage over the conflict, will look for ways to regain control. This will likely involve sustained long-range missile and drone attacks on US bases, regional (GCC) infrastructure, and shipping, as long as Iran can maintain them.

Even if the Strait is successfully reopened by force, it won’t be very useful if the region’s oil fields, refineries, desalination plants, and ports are burning from missile and drone strikes.

The US and Israel have already opened the door to attacks on civilian infrastructure by hitting the South Pars field and, more recently, a brand new suspension bridge in Iran.

Therefore, for a mission like this to succeed in achieving its intended goal, the US would need to target all remaining drones and missiles in Iran and eliminate nearly all of them, while maintaining an almost perfect interception rate against long-range missile attacks across the entire region, as long as Iran has missiles and drones to use. The US would also have to prevent the strategic islands near Hormuz and the coastal areas on the Iranian side from being used by IRGC naval, drone, and missile forces.

If all that can be done, then the US could succeed.

Even if the Strait is reopened, it may not matter. A Gulf region with burning oil fields, damaged ports, and disrupted desalination is not a functioning energy system. At that point, the mission has succeeded tactically and failed strategically.

For more detailed assessments of how such a conflict might actually play out, I’ve been involved in great conversations with Shawn Howard AVDD, Adam Karaoguz, CDR Salamander, and Major (retired) Gus March-Phillips1. They all understand the “on the ground” complexities better than I do. For those of you looking to go deeper on those aspects, they are all great sources. If any of them are reading this and object to any of my analysis, I’d welcome their input in the comments!

Verdict

That said, I now estimate a 40% chance of this happening before May 1st, with the possibility of rising back up to over 80% once the necessary forces are in the region. This isn’t because I see a higher chance of de-escalation, but because I see a much greater risk of a prolonged stalemate for at least another month, which I cover in scenario 5 below.

Scenario 5: The Strait remains shut for months, if not longer

Re-opening the Strait forcibly would demand extensive manpower across land, sea, and air forces. Operations would need to cover the entire region, not just the immediate area of the Strait, which already spans a large zone. Staging areas for troops would be necessary, though Gulf allies are unlikely to agree to this under current conditions. For instance, once the 82nd Airborne establishes a base in a country, that nation could become a target for Iranian missile and drone attacks.

Given the threat of Iranian counter-strikes across the region, it will become clear that the focus is not just on objectives but also on maintaining a high operational tempo to weaken Iran’s ability to respond, increasing both manpower and materiel needs.

Even if the plan meets all its goals but significantly damages regional oil and gas infrastructure, it would be a strategic failure, since keeping the Strait open to tankers without access to major ports and refineries is meaningless. This reduces the margin for error and raises the number of military units needed from all branches. Coordinating all this could take months.

Ultimately, two Marine Corps MEUs and the 82nd Airborne may not suffice for a comprehensive plan with a good chance of strategic success. They might pursue a limited approach, but that could be too slow and insufficient to prevent Iran from damaging regional infrastructure during execution. As US forces amass in the region, the global economic impact will deepen, and political pressure on the US government to resolve the deadlock—by any means—will intensify. Under such circumstances, it may become harder for Trump to withdraw.

Verdict

The reason for this is simple. It’s the only physically available option for the US for at least another 30 days, and probably longer.

An operation in April with the available US forces would need to be carefully limited in scope; while it might proceed (40% chance), the US military is more likely to decide that it requires additional equipment and personnel to achieve the set objectives. It’s also likely that the list of objectives for the operation is expanding daily as the plan continues to develop.

A planning gap between what the US military needs to do and the capabilities on the ground is almost certainly opening up now.

By the end of May 2026, that gap will either be closed, or the economic pressure to act will have become intolerable, or (more likely), both. At that point, the probability shifts decisively back towards escalation, unless a political off-ramp can be found in the interim.

Where This Leaves Us

This option is not hopeless, as most of the world’s governments are hoping for this outcome. Unfortunately, the three countries that are most critical here, Iran, Israel, and the US, have fundamental differences that make it extremely hard for them to get together and do a deal directly.

Then again, the best short-term outcome is unstable in the medium term. A reopening of Hormuz gets the world “back to business,” but also gives time and money to Iran to re-arm and renew its efforts to secure ICBMs, nuclear warheads, and other tools so it can prevent a repeat of what just happened.

Iran knows this. The US knows this. Israel knows this. All sides know that all of the other sides know this. This renders any cease-fire and re-opening event a temporary band-aid on a long-term problem.

It will be enormously tempting for the US and Israel to try to “finish the job” and push for a more durable settlement. That settlement will surely require Iran to relinquish its enriched uranium and end its long-range missile program. If the two sides cannot come to terms on this, then Robert Pape is right, we are truly in an escalation trap, and this conflict will grind on and on until something breaks definitively in one direction or the other.

The system is no longer choosing between outcomes. It is moving through a constrained sequence of states, and most of those paths do not lead to a clean resolution. Reopening the Strait is not the same as resolving the conflict, and most paths forward do not achieve both outcomes.

Immediate Consequences For the World

If the Strait of Hormuz remains closed for too long, the global economy faces the risk of suffering a form of congestive heart failure. It may not lead to a complete collapse, but it could cause persistent inflation that hampers activity, making nearly everything more difficult and costly to produce—especially microchips and food, two industries that are vital to the modern economy for very different reasons.

Ray Dalio has been warning about systemic financial fragility for over a year, even when the Strait of Hormuz was still open. If his main scenario is correct, a long-term closure of the strait could accelerate the timeline for the next major financial crisis—a crisis he already predicted was approaching within the next few years, even before the current situation developed.

This essay is based on a simple model I created this week to help me understand all the factors involved. The longer this conflict continues, the more I plan to update and refine the model. Of course, I hope I won’t need to do that. My assumptions and conclusions differ somewhat from Polymarket; I haven’t had time to do a full cross-referencing and comparative analysis.

Analytic Model Summary: Primitives, Assumptions, and Conclusions