In the days since, Venezuelans living abroad have celebrated ecstatically. But the country itself has remained quiet. Most people seem to recognize that it’s possible little has really changed. Trump, after all, has left Maduro’s regime largely intact, recognizing Delcy Rodríguez, Maduro’s vice president, as interim president before she had even publicly accepted the position herself. The question is whether the shifts will remain relatively modest, or if Maduro’s extraction presages bigger changes within both Venezuela and the region.

There is a wide variety of possibilities. Maduro’s removal might facilitate Venezuela’s transition to democracy, tank Cuba’s regime, and advance Trump’s bid to assert U.S. hemispheric dominance. Alternatively, a reshuffled Maduro regime might simply accept more deportees from the United States and give Washington control over its oil reserves, but otherwise change little. The regional shock waves could be limited. In fact, the inability to fundamentally change Venezuela might end up revealing the limits of American power.

But the eventual outcomes will probably fall somewhere in between these two extremes. In the short-term, the consequences for Venezuela will likely be muted, as Trump tries to work with the reconfigured regime to secure his top objective: access to oil. Other Latin American governments might retaliate with words, but most will avoid responding with deeds so as not to incur Trump’s anger. As time goes on, however, the situation may become more fraught. Trump might attack Venezuela again, especially if Rodríguez is unwilling or, constrained by other regime figures, unable to comply with his directives. Venezuelan oil shipments to Cuba will likely decrease, weakening (although not necessarily collapsing) the island’s already flagging regime. Colombia could face American intervention, given that its left-wing president—unlike most of its neighbors—seems eager to fight with Trump and that Trump welcomes this dispute. And critically, Latin American countries, especially the larger, more geographically distant ones, may try to further diversify their economic and security relationships to reduce their exposure to an assertive and demanding Washington. Trump’s attack, in other words, could advance or set back his hemispheric dream.

PATH OF LEAST RESISTANCE

To figure out how Venezuela and the region might change, analysts should first pay attention to the breadth of the Trump administration’s demands of Venezuela’s reshuffled leadership. That will require looking less at the orders and aspirations Trump lists off the cuff in public, which are bound to vary, and more at the reports and leaks about what he and his team are privately pressing Caracas to deliver.

One possibility is that these demands will be narrow: opening up Venezuela’s oil reserves to long-term U.S. control and investment, sidelining certain geopolitical rivals, including Iran and Cuba, and getting Caracas to accept an increased number of deportees. Trump alluded to such a scenario in his January 3 press conference, when he stressed the importance of Venezuela’s oil and evinced little interest in the restoration of its democracy. In fact, Trump barely mentioned Venezuela’s opposition; when he did, it was only to say that the opposition leader and recent Nobel Peace Prize-recipient, Maria Corina Machado, was insufficiently “respected” to run the country. By contrast, Trump suggested Rodríguez, a longtime loyalist to Maduro and his predecessor, Hugo Chávez, could make her country “great again.” Trump also said that a group of administration officials would “run” Venezuela, although the administration later declared that he meant Washington would run it indirectly by threatening the Maduro regime’s remaining leaders into complying with American demands.

Such a limited U.S. agenda might satisfy many members of Trump’s team, including Vice President JD Vance, the top policy adviser Stephen Miller, and others skeptical of nation-building projects and more focused on domestic priorities. Trump might also perceive this path as the most doable and least unpopular with Americans, only a third of whom said they supported the use of military force to remove Maduro in a January 5 poll. One congressional staffer, speaking on the condition of anonymity, told me, “We just saw a trade deal with a change of leaders.”

But other Trump allies have signaled they will press for harder, more ambitious shifts: namely, an eventual end to Venezuela’s Bolivarian socialist regime and a return to democracy, likely through negotiations. Such figures include Secretary of State Marco Rubio and important Republicans in Congress. Although Trump seems less interested in democracy, Rubio clearly has his and other administration officials’ ears on matters related to Latin America and may be able to convince them that a democratic transition will serve their interests. Republican lawmakers, for their part, might persuade Trump that pursuing only narrow, oil- and migration-centric goals will hurt the party electorally. That could especially prove true among Latino voters in Florida eager for regime change in Venezuela and Cuba, many of whom already feel betrayed by the harsher than expected implementation of Trump’s deportation policies. (Miami just elected a Democratic mayor for the first time in nearly 30 years.)

The Latin American regime under the greatest immediate pressure may not be Venezuela’s.

Trump’s decisions will also depend on what choices Venezuelan officials make next. If they defy the White House by refusing to hand over oil rights or to reduce ties with Cuba, Washington might again attack the country, as Trump has repeatedly stated. But cooperation seems the likelier path. Rodríguez, in particular, has a reputation for pragmatism. She may have condemned Washington’s attacks, but such statements could reflect a need to appease regime hard-liners and would-be rivals, such as Diosdado Cabello, the minister for interior, justice, and peace. They could also be designed to distract from suspicions that she helped turn Maduro in. Either way, they should not be taken at face value. According to reporting by The Miami Herald, last year, Rodríguez and her politically influential brother, who was just reappointed as head of the National Assembly, put forward a plan to U.S. officials in which she would replace Maduro and work with the United States, in exchange for keeping his system in place. (Rubio, according to the report, blocked the deal.) Rodríguez is also less committed to Cuba than Maduro was, which news outlets suggest is the result of her frustration with Cuba’s failure to reliably pay Venezuela for its oil shipments. At least some Trump administration officials told The New York Times off the record they think they can work with her. In fact, if she or other regime officials did secretly collude with the United States to turn over Maduro—as seems possible—then cooperation with Washington may already be underway.

Trump has another incentive to keep his demands of Rodríguez narrow: if he does, she is more likely to agree to them. Most U.S. officials probably do not want to attack Caracas again. It is a move that, rather than compelling obedience, could easily sow chaos. A narrow deal—support for Rodríguez in exchange for more oil and less aid to Havana—is thus the path of least resistance for both sides.

Of course, for Venezuela to cooperate with either narrow or broad demands, someone has to be in control of the country. Right now, that remains the Rodríguez siblings. But they face powerful potential challengers—most notably Cabello, who wields influence over Venezuela’s armed paramilitaries, or colectivos, as well as over the country’s national police and parts of its intelligence apparatus. He may want to stop Caracas from cooperating with the White House, which views him with great suspicion. (Cabello was indicted by the U.S. Department of Justice for drug trafficking, alongside Maduro.) If Cabello cannot get Rodríguez to follow his requests, he could try either to depose her or to make the country ungovernable. In that case, much would depend on what the head of Venezuela’s armed forces, Vladimir Padrino López—the regime’s third power center—opts to do. As of now, it is impossible to say who he might side with, or whether he could keep the military unified if infighting seriously intensifies.

POWER PROBLEMS

If Rodríguez works with Trump and maintains control of her country, then the Latin American regime under the greatest immediate pressure may not actually be Venezuela’s. Instead, it could be Cuba’s. The island is dependent on Venezuelan assistance, and it was in dire straits even before Trump had Maduro captured. The Cuban economy is in tatters. Tourism, its primary industry, has shrunk to at least half its pre-pandemic levels with no signs of rebounding. Crime and disease are on the rise as law enforcement and hospitals break down, thanks to insufficient financing. The island’s government has withstood enormous pressure before. But it is facing its greatest-ever crisis.

The most immediate risk for Cuba’s rulers is energy. The island relies heavily on imported fuel, much of it sourced from Venezuela, to power its electrical grid, which is teetering on the brink of failure. Over 40 percent of the country goes without energy during peak hours. Some provinces have power for just two to four hours a day. If Washington now cuts Cuba off from almost all Venezuelan oil—the U.S. naval blockade having already stopped some shipments—the grid could collapse. Havana will surely look to other countries to step in, but it is unlikely to find many suppliers. Mexico sends some oil currently, but less than in previous years. With Trump repeatedly threatening to attack Mexican territory, its officials are unlikely to increase supplies now. Brazil doesn’t seem inclined to replace Venezuela either, since leftist President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, known as Lula, who is running for reelection next year, knows that doing so would undermine his newly improved relationship with Trump and potentially invite election meddling. Russia, strained by its invasion of Ukraine, and China are also unlikely to fill the vacuum.

If Havana, usually protected from prolonged blackouts, plunges into darkness, the regime could face mass protests as large as or larger than those of July 2021. (The 2021 demonstrations, the first of their scale in decades, showed the depth and breadth of public anger.) Such protests might prove tough to contain, especially if they played out in dense Havana neighborhoods. Cuba’s security forces frequently engage in brutal methods of smothering unrest—detention, torture, threats. But they have never shot and kill dozens of people at a protest. It is unclear what would happen if that changed and whether protests might cascade.

Trump has threatened to use direct military force against Colombia.

Still, it’s entirely possible the regime could survive even this dire situation. The Cuban military has immense stakes in the government’s survival, given that it controls much of the economy through a web of companies that would vanish after a political transition. And it seems no one on the island is in a position to challenge the armed forces. As with Maduro’s regime, deposing Cuba’s communist regime might require a U.S. military operation—a maneuver that neither Trump nor the American public seemingly has much appetite for. The president, for example, recently stated he believes the Cuban regime will fall on its own, without direct U.S. involvement.

Trump has, however, threatened to use direct military force against Colombia. He has said the country is “run by a sick man, who likes making cocaine and selling it to the United States, and he’s not going to be doing it for very long.” Colombian President Gustavo Petro, unlike the Venezuelan and Cuban leaders, was democratically elected. He is a leftist ideologically opposed to Trump and who was at times friendly with Maduro. Yet Petro is not changing his behavior. To the contrary, he has relished the confrontation, both because it gives him a much-sought international pedestal and because he thinks it will help his political successor. Colombia’s presidential election is just months away, and Petro’s preferred candidate, Iván Cepeda, is likely to face scrutiny over the current government’s unmet policy promises. Petro is eager to shift the conversation away from domestic challenges, and squaring off against Trump serves that purpose.

There are reasons to doubt that Trump will make good on his threats against Bogotá. Washington seems to expect that a conservative president will win in May. The United States also relies on Colombia, its main Latin American security partner, to help with much of its regional counternarcotics efforts, even if current U.S.-Colombian tensions have obstructed them. But Trump is unpredictable, and if Petro continues to forthrightly respond to U.S. actions in Venezuela, Trump could intervene forcefully in some way.

AMERICAS FIRST?

Beyond Cuba, Colombia, and of course Venezuela, Maduro’s removal may have more limited near-term consequences. Lula criticized Washington’s strikes, but his government quickly recognized Rodríguez as interim president and made no real effort to defend Maduro. Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum, another leftist and occasional Maduro apologist, likewise has other priorities: navigating upcoming trade renegotiations and avoiding U.S. military strikes on Mexican soil against drug cartels. Mexico’s dependence on trade with the United States sharply limits her room for maneuver.

This silence indicates that much of the Western Hemisphere is, for now, Washington’s domain. For years, analysts have watched China make inroads in the region and argued that U.S. influence was slipping. But Maduro’s seizure suggests that past administrations—out of caution, respect for law and norms, and sometimes neglect—simply didn’t exercise the substantial leverage that Washington has long possessed.

It is uncertain, however, whether Trump’s intervention in Venezuela will become a testament to American power or expose its limits, and eventually contribute to its erosion. Many countries are already responding to Trump’s punitive use of tariffs by hurrying to strengthen diplomatic and trade ties with Asia and Europe. Some states, including Brazil and Colombia, are experimenting with building closer defense and tech ties, respectively, with China. Maduro’s extraction may accelerate these trends. Trump could also lose interest in Washington’s so-called near abroad, moving on to other items on his international agenda. The administration’s recently issued National Security Strategy puts the Western Hemisphere above every other region, and Maduro’s capture and the massive U.S. naval buildup in the Caribbean suggests that this ambition is not simply rhetoric. But this reallocation of assets may or may not endure. Outside of Rubio, few officials in the Trump administration seem personally invested in an “Americas first” foreign policy that goes beyond more regional security cooperation and increased deportations.

What Trump does next in Venezuela and the Caribbean will thus be very telling. His interventions will test just how far U.S. power to shape hemispheric affairs reaches.