Russian and Chinese foreign policy tactics are converging in new and synergistic ways.

This dynamic is most apparent in eastern Europe and the Balkans, where long-standing Russian efforts to discredit democracy and the EU exist in tandem with major infrastructure investments from China. Consider Serbia, where Russia has long projected influence to undermine democratic progress. The country now has a central role in China’s plans to fund transport projects in Europe as part of the One Belt, One Road initiative. Serbian leaders view Chinese financing as an opportunity to promote themselves domestically by delivering improved infrastructure without abiding by the strict regulations that come with European funds. This has created the popular misperception that China now invests more in Serbia than do major EU countries. When this economic leverage combines with the sustained drumbeat of Russian messaging about the EU’s failings, it effectively tempers Serbia’s resolve to pursue reforms such as strengthening the rule of law required for EU accession. Despite differing interests in Serbia and a lack of coordination, Russia’s and China’s efforts are mutually reinforcing.

China and Russia are also capitalizing on the rising tide of nationalism and discourse about sovereignty to portray Western support for democratic institutions as foreign influence that must be resisted. China has long peddled this narrative in Southeast Asia, particularly among authoritarian-leaning governments such as Cambodia, as has Russia in the Middle East. Today, such messaging has growing resonance in Europe, where Moscow seeks to amplify the narratives of illiberal populists and anti-EU forces and paint them as patriotic defenders of national sovereignty. Russia has proactively fed nationalist sentiments against EU integration, including by interfering in support of Brexit and Catalan independence. These campaigns advance the Kremlin’s objectives to magnify European divisions and make the EU a less cohesive and decisive actor.

Current shifts in geopolitical power are a second factor increasing the potency of the threat that Russia and China pose to democracy. History (and research by the political scientists Carles Boix and Seva Gunitsky) shows that when the world is led by one or more authoritarian powers, more countries become authoritarian. When the Soviet Union’s power increased early in the Cold War, for example, authoritarianism spread across the globe. The defeat of communism and the United States’ triumph, in contrast, caused democracies to proliferate and the number of countries under autocratic rule to decrease. The shift in geopolitical tides means that today, the factors that have been shown to enhance democracy are now working in reverse, creating conditions more conducive to the spread of authoritarian rule.

China and Russia have long pursued a number of direct actions to prop up friendly dictatorships, enhancing the durability of these regimes. Most visibly, they use loans and investments to reinforce besieged authoritarian governments, as Russia has done in Venezuela and China in Cambodia. They also offer no-strings-attached financial aid and weapons, diluting Western leverage to press for human rights and rule-of-law reform. And they proactively transmit their survival strategies to governments and leaders looking to shore up their domestic control. Both countries are convinced of the threat of Western-backed revolution and have responded not only by “diffusion-proofing” their own regimes but by persuading other governments of the dangers of Western engagement and teaching best practices for controlling their citizens and guarding against these democratic incursions. China in particular has become an exporter of surveillance and policing tactics, with Chinese companies selling facial-recognition systems and training authoritarian governments on how to most effectively monitor phone and Internet activity.

Geopolitical changes, however, amplify these direct efforts as Russia and China engage with a broader spectrum of states. China’s rising power and Russia’s assertiveness mean that they are expanding their networks of trade and patronage with many states at once—as the United States did in the aftermath of the Cold War—creating greater opportunities to encourage authoritarian tendencies. But even beyond buttressing like-minded autocrats, Russia’s and China’s international activism may also work to weaken democracies. Research shows that extensive linkages with the West (through aid, trade, and social networks) encouraged democracy and its consolidation after the Cold War. Russia’s and especially China’s growing ties now raise the risk of a growing global tide of authoritarianism.

Shifts in geopolitics also mean that Russia and China don’t have to intentionally engage in autocracy promotion to weaken democracy. Even without a deliberate strategy to export their models of governance, China’s rise and Russia’s assertiveness send a powerful signal to other leaders about the success of their models and alter perceptions about what constitutes a legitimate regime. Putin has offered a model of governance that others seek to emulate. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, for example, seem to admire Putin’s strongman tactics and have adopted elements of his repertoire to enhance their control. As Xi has consolidated his personal power, the Chinese system now looks more like the Russian one. Although there are important differences, Xi and Putin together send a potent message to onlooking leaders of the success and desirability of strongman rule.